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PUBLICLY FINANCED JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Charles Gardner Geyh*
I. INTRODUCTION
To fund increasingly expensive judicial races, candidates are
soliciting more contributions from lawyers, would-be litigants, and
special interest groups, which creates the perception that judges are
beholden to those contributors. One means to eliminate that percep-
tion would be to finance judicial elections with public funds and
thereby obviate the need for private contributions altogether. Indeed
the case for public financing is arguably more compelling for judicial
elections than political branch races because unlike the latter, where
constituent influence over political branch decision making is appro-
priate and desirable, the perception of external influence overjudi-
cial decision making is especially problematic.
Public financing programs have been introduced in over twenty
states. Ambitious public funding legislation recently enacted in Ari-
zona, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont suggests that interest in
public financing programs is increasing.! However, only Wisconsin
has made a serious effort to fund judicial races. The most serious
hurdles to publicly funding judicial elections include:
* ensuring that the program is adequately funded;
• Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. The views ex-
pressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the ABA
Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, on which I serve as
reporter, the opinions of the National Center for State Courts, the Joyce Foun-
dation, or the Open Society Institute. I would like to thank Philip Adam Davis
for his excellent research assistance, and Luke Bierman, Eileen Gallagher,
David Rottman, and Roy Schotland for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Mary M. Janicki, Public Financing Update, OLR RESEARCH REP.
(Nov. 4, 1999), at http://www.cga.state.ct.uslps99/rptlolr/htm/99-r-I 102.htm
1467
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:1467
" making certain that only serious candidates qualify for public
funds;
" offsetting the impact of excessive independent expenditures on
behalf of candidates whose publicly funded opponents have
agreed to limit their spending; and
" balancing the benefits to judicial independence of diminishing
the impact of private money in judicial elections with the costs
of increased competition in judicial races.
In an effort to facilitate discussion of public financing as one
possible means to ameliorate some of the recent problems that have
arisen in judicial elections, Part II of this paper summarizes the
problems that public financing is intended to address, while Part III
discusses public financing structures, their potential advantages, and
their difficulties.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATELY FINANCED
JuDIcIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
Six problems are associated with the private financing of judi-
cial election campaigns.
A. The Cost ofRunning Judicial Election Campaigns
Is Increasing Dramatically
"In the thirty-nine states that elect judges at some level," re-
ported The Nation magazine in 1998, "the cost of judicial races is
rising at least as fast as that of either Congressional races or presi-
dential campaigns, as candidates for the bench pay for sophisticated
ads, polls and consultants." 2 For example, the cost of running su-
preme court races in Alabama increased from $237,281 in 1986 to
$2,080,000 in 1996; in Ohio costs rose from $100,000 in 1980 to
over $2.7 million in 1986; and in Pennsylvania the cost went from
$523,000 in 1987 to $2.8 million in 1995.3
2. Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, THE NATION,
Jan. 26, 1998, at 11. Information presented here on privately financed judicial
election campaigns has been drawn from articles published largely in the
popular press of the referenced states, and may for that reason be inaccurate.
3. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 68, 69-
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B. To Cover Their Costs, Judges Must Solicit Funds from
Contributors Interested in Case Outcomes
As the cost of campaigning escalates, judicial candidates are re-
quired to raise more money from contributors who typically include
lawyers, litigants, or organizations with an economic or political in-
terest in the outcomes of cases to be decided by the courts where the
candidates are seeking election-or reelection. In Illinois, for exam-
ple, one recent supreme court candidate was criticized for receiving
$80,000 in contributions from ten personal injury law firms, while
another was called to task for accepting $35,000 from a real estate
developer In Ohio, The Plain Dealer reported that $2.1 million of
the $4.1 million in contributions received by supreme court justices
from 1993 to 1998 came from lawyers and lobbyists.5 And in Texas,
a reform group study reported that $3.7 million of $9.2 million con-
tributed to supreme court justices between 1994 and 1997 were
"given by contributors who were closely linked to parties on the
court docket.
' 6
C. In Addition to Soliciting Contributions, Judges
Often Take Out Loans to Make Up for Revenue
Shortfalls During Their Campaigns
Judges who are not independently wealthy and who go into debt
to underwrite their campaigns must later repay those debts with cam-
paign contributions. The pressure on such judges to raise money is
thus compounded-they must seek out contributors to ensure not
only their reelection but their solvency as well.
D. When Judges Make Decisions That Favor Contributors,
They Are Accused of Favoritism
Given the high volume of contributions to judicial campaigns
from interested individuals and organizations, it is inevitable that
members of the press or public will call attention to what they regard
4. See Scott Fomek, High Court Candidates Spar Over Contributions,
Cm. SuN-TMES, Feb. 4,2000, at 18.
5. See T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors,
THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A.
6. Janet Elliott, "60 Minutes" Visit Finds Court's Defenders in Hiding,
TEx. LAw., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1.
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as a suspicious correlation between a judge's campaign contributions
and the judge's subsequent, favorable treatment of the contributor.
In New York, for example, the "Association of the Bar of the City of
New York found an apparent correlation between campaign contri-
butions to Surrogate Court judges and appointments as guardian ad
litem. ' '7 In Ohio, The Plain Dealer reported on the assertions of a
court reform group, that the "Ohio Supreme Court ruled favorably
two-thirds of the time for clients of the 20 Cleveland area attorneys
who gave the most to justices' political campaigns from 1993
through 1998. "8 In some cases, such as in Ohio, reported correla-
tions may be questioned, and in other cases, true correlations may
have perfectly innocuous explanations. Even if the reality of influ-
ence can be rebutted, however, appearance problems remain.
E. Irrespective of Whether Contributors Do in
Fact Influence Judicial Decision Making, the
Public Perceives That They Do
The public perception that judges are beholden to or influenced
by their contributors is pervasive. In Louisiana, for example, a Baton
Rouge survey found that 56% of voters thought that judicial deci-
sions are influenced by campaign contributions, while only 33%
thought that "for the most part judges rule impartially." 9 In Pennsyl-
vania, a 1998 poll sponsored by a special commission appointed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that nine out of ten voters
believed that judicial decisions were influenced by large campaign
contributions.10 In Texas, a 1998 survey sponsored by the state su-
preme court found that 83% of Texas adults, 69% of court personnel,
and 79% of Texas attorneys believed that campaign contributions in-
fluenced judicial decisions "very significantly" or "fairly
7. John Caher, Forum Explores Judicial Election Funding Reform, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 8, 1999, at 1.
8. Brown, supra note 5.
9. Lanny Keller, Judicial Campaigns Undermine Respect, THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 13, 2000, at 9B.
10. See Dennis Chaptman, Process of Electing Judges Debated; Officials
From 17 States Study Campaign Finance, Threats to Independence,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2000, at 2B.
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significantly," while 48% of judges indicated that money had an im-
pact on judicial decisions. 1
F. Problems Associated With Private Campaign Fund-Raising
May Discourage Exceptionally Qualified Judicial Candidates
from Pursuing or Remaining in Judicial Office
Many judges have expressed distaste for fund-raising and dis-
comfort with receiving contributions from lawyers and interested or-
ganizations. Some have resigned to avoid private fund-raising that
they regard as threatening independence. Former Texas Supreme
Court Justice Bob Gammage, for example, reportedly quit after one
term because, in his view, the elections of judges in Texas had be-
come too partisan and the politics of elections had influenced the
state's judges.12
II. PUBLIC FINANCING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRIVATELY FUNDED
JUDIcIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: ADVANTAGES, OPTIONS, AND
PROBLEMS
A. The Potential Advantages of Public Financing
For states that remain wedded to partisan or nonpartisan judicial
elections, the potential advantages of underwriting judicial cam-
paigns with public funds are relatively clear. The more money
judges receive from public sources, the less they will have to raise
from private groups and individuals who are interested in the out-
comes of cases the judges decide. Thus, public funding reduces the
potential for campaign contributions to influence judicial behavior
and addresses the public perception that such influence occurs.
Indeed, the case for public financing of judicial elections is ar-
guably more compelling than for legislative or executive branch
races. Governors and legislators are, by design, the people's repre-
sentatives. They are not expected to insulate themselves from the
electorate, but are supposed to be influenced by and to reflect their
11. See Lawrence N. Hansen, Editorial, Contribution Limits Protect De-
mocracy, CmI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at 28.
12. See Ross Ramsey, Justice Gammage to Resign, Blasts Judge Election
Process, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 25, 1995, at A32.
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constituents' point of view. For this reason, political branch office-
seekers publicize the decisions they intend to make so that voters
have a basis upon which to cast their ballots. The peril of financing
such races with private funds is not that it enables contributors to in-
fluence governmental decision making, but that it enables contribu-
tors to influence governmental decision making more than other con-
stituents. Judicial candidates, in contrast, are not representatives.
They are supposed to be-and appear to be-impartial, to apply the
law as it is written regardless of whether it is popular with voters,
and are subject to discipline if they make campaign promises to de-
cide particular cases in particular ways. Because virtually any exter-
nal influence over a judge's independent decision making is inappro-
priate, the need to immunize judges from the influence-and the
appearance of influence--of campaign contributions may be all the
more pressing.
The six problems associated with privately funded judicial cam-
paigns, that were summarized in the preceding section, have arisen
not only in states that select judges in partisan and nonpartisan elec-
tions, but also in "merit selection" states where appointed judges
have had to raise substantial sums in campaign contributions to fend
off opposition in their retention elections. 3 At the same time, how-
ever, merit selection states are different in ways that warrant separate
analysis.
First, the problems that public financing seeks to address will,
on average, be less acute in merit selection states. In such states,
election-related problems are eliminated from the initial selection
process because the judges are appointed (although judges are also
often initially appointed to fill vacancies in contested election states).
When judges later stand for reelection, they run against their records
rather than competing candidates. This assures that contentious, ex-
pensive elections will occur only when voters are dissatisfied with
the judge's performance, and not every time another candidate wants
the judge's job. Moreover, because voters cannot be sure that a more
satisfactory replacement will be appointed if they vote an incumbent
13. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 70 (stating "in many cases judges who are
appointed through merit selections are still subject to retention elections, with
the same high costs and the partisan nature of most elective campaigns.").
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out, significant opposition to a judge's retention is likely to arise only
when dissatisfaction levels are high.
Second, in retention elections, there are no "opponents" to fi-
nance. Publicly funding such elections in conventional ways would
thus involve one of three equally problematic alternatives: 1) to un-
derwrite judges only, and be accused of "stacking the deck" in the
incumbents' favor; 2) to give an equal share of the public funds to
private opposition groups, for the purpose of subsidizing advertising
campaigns attacking the decisions of incumbent judges, who are
subject to ethics rules that will often forbid them from responding; or
3) to regulate the issues that opposition groups may address as a pre-
condition to receipt of public funds, and be accused of attempting to
censor them.
This does not mean that public financing has no place in merit
selection states. The objections raised in the preceding paragraph
might be overcome to some extent, if funded opposition groups were
required to abide by the same rules as incumbents. Thus, in ex-
change for public funds, an opposition group might be required to
honor Code of Judicial Conduct restrictions on its campaign-related
speech. At a minimum, alternative forms of public funding-such as
subsidized voter guides or publicly disseminated judicial perform-
ance evaluations-might be appropriate.
B. Public Funding Options
1. Basic features of alternative public funding systems
4
There are several basic questions that any public financing sys-
tem must address-questions that have generated a daunting array of
possible answers from states that have implemented or considered
implementing such systems. The variety of public financing pro-
grams is captured in an excerpt to a Connecticut Office of Legisla-
tive Research memorandum, attached as Appendix A to this paper.
The excerpt presents a graphic summary of public funding systems
implemented in different states.
14. For an excellent general discussion of public funding alternatives, see
ELIZABETH DANIEL, SUBSIDIZING POLrTICAL CAMPAIGNS: THE VARIETIES &
VALUES OF PUBLIC FINANCING (Brennan Center for Justice) (2000), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/resourcesresourcescfseries.htnl.
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Which races should be publicly funded? Almost all states that
have implemented public funding programs have confined their ap-
plicability to nonjudicial elections: gubernatorial races, other state-
wide races, or, less frequently, legislative races.15 Ifjudicial races are
included, should trial court races be publicly funded, or only supreme
court or court of appeals contests? Should public funding apply only
to general elections, or primary elections as well?
How much public funding should be provided? Public funds
may be used to partially or fully fund judicial and other races. In ei-
ther case, the issue is how much public money to make available.
Because participation in public funding systems must ordinarily be
voluntary to satisfy First Amendment requirements, the success of
such programs depends on keeping funding levels high enough to
entice candidates to opt in.16
Which candidates should be eligible to receive public funds? For
obvious reasons, the availability of public money should be limited
to serious candidates. There are a number of ways in which that can
be done. One is to limit eligible candidates to those who gather a
minimum number of petition signatures. Another is to require grant
applicants to generate a minimum number or amount of small cam-
paign contributions. A third option is to limit grant eligibility to
candidates who received-or whose party received-a minimum
percentage of the vote in a previous election.
What conditions, if any, should be imposed on candidates who
receive public funds? Although states may not require candidates to
accept public funds, they may condition the distribution of public
funds to candidates who choose to receive them, on the candidates'
agreement to abide by specified conditions. Such conditions may in-
clude imposing limits on campaign contributions and spending, or
requiring candidates to participate in debates.
How can excessive spending by or on behalf ofa publicly funded
candidate's opponent be addressed? Special problems arise when
publicly funded candidates bound by spending limits are opposed by
candidates who are not bound by spending limits because they do not
15. See infra app. A.
16. For a discussion of the First Amendment requirement of voluntary par-
ticipation in public funding systems, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109
(1976).
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receive public funds, or who are supported by independent groups
that campaign for the candidate on their own. In such situations,
publicly funded candidates may be authorized to receive supple-
mental public funds or to exceed their private spending limits to en-
sure that they are not unfairly disadvantaged.
How should public funds be dispersed? The most obvious
means to distribute public funds is through simple block grants.
Other means, however, include awarding candidates grants that
match private contributions; reimbursing contributors with vouchers
or tax breaks; or delivering benefits in-kind, in the form of television
time or voters guides.
How should revenues needed to fund a public financing system
be generated? As discussed below, adequately funding public fi-
nancing programs may be the single biggest problem such programs
confront. Possibilities include general tax revenues, tax checkoffs-
which allow taxpayers to earmark a dollar amount of their tax liabil-
ity to the campaign fund; tax add-ons-which allow taxpayers to add
to their tax liability with a contribution to the campaign fund; crimi-
nal fine or civil penalty surcharges; court fees; or attorney licensing
fees.
How and by whom should a public financing program be ad-
ministered? Independent agencies are often responsible for admin-
istering state election laws, including public funding programs. In
the case of judicial elections, the issue is whether the judiciary's in-
stitutional independence might be undermined by locating the regu-
latory entity outside the judicial branch.
What are the First Amendment impediments to publicly funded
elections? In Buckley v. Valeo, 17 the United States Supreme Court
held mandatory spending limits unconstitutional, but in a footnote
observed that Congress could condition voluntary public funding on
candidates' willingness to abide by expenditure ceilings.'8 Unan-
swered questions remain, however, concerning how coercive "vol-
untary" programs can be, and how extensively states may limit con-
tributions to, and spending by, publicly funded candidates before
running afoul of the First Amendment. 19
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See id. at 57 n.65.
19. See id. at 24-25.
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2. Public funding ofjudicial elections: the Wisconsin experience
a. a description of the Wisconsin program
Although several states have ostensibly provided for publicly fi-
nanced judicial elections, only Wisconsin has made a significant
move in that direction.20 Under the Wisconsin system, a Wisconsin
Election Campaign Fund has been created with revenues generated
by a one dollar state tax return checkoff.2' Eight percent of the fund
is earmarked for grants to supreme court candidates in years when
there is a supreme court election. 22 The remainder of the fund un-
derwrites campaigns for governor, lieutenant governor, attorney gen-
eral, state treasurer, secretary of state, superintendent of public in-
struction, and the legislature.
23
To be eligible to receive public funds, supreme court candidates
must be opposed, and must have raised contributions totaling slightly
less than $11,000-5% of the authorized disbursement limitation-in
increments of $100 or less.24 The maximum public grant available
for a supreme court candidate is $97,031, which represents 45% of a
$215,625 spending limit that, together with specified contribution
limits, candidates must agree to honor in exchange for accepting
public funds.2 5 In the event that a grant recipient is opposed by a
candidate who has not accepted public funds and has not agreed to
comply with spending and contribution limits voluntarily, the grant
recipient will be relieved of the duty to abide by spending and con-
tribution limits. 26
20. California permits supreme court candidates to make free statements in
the state ballot pamphlet. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13307 (2001). North Caro-
lina, Texas, and Utah provide limited public funds to political parties that
could be, but have not been, used for judicial candidates. See Craig Byron
Holman, Remarks to the American Bar Association Commission on Public Fi-
nancing of Judicial Campaigns 121 (Sept. 8, 2000). Montana has abandoned a
tax add-on funded program for supreme court candidates. See id.
21. See WIs. STAT. § 71.10(3)(a) (2000).
22. See id. § 11.50(3)(a)(2) (2000).
23. See id. § 11.50(4)(b) (2000).
24. See id. § 11.50(2)(a)(5) (2000).
25. See id. §§ 11.26(9)(b), 11.31 (2000).
26. See id. § 11.50(2)(i) (2000).
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The Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund is administered by the
Elections Board. The board is comprised of eight members variously
selected by the governor, the chief justice, the assembly speaker, the
senate majority leader, the minority leaders of both houses, and the
chairs of the two major political parties.
b. the effectiveness of the Wisconsin program
Taxpayer participation in the Wisconsin checkoff system de-
clined from close to 20% in 1979 to 8.7% in 1998-which reflected
a slight rebound from the all time low of 8.1% set in 1996.2' The re-
suiting fund has been inadequate to provide candidates with the
$97,031 grants authorized by the program. As a consequence, after
1989, when both supreme court candidates were fully funded, the
grants given to nine participating supreme court candidates have av-
eraged only $45,354.28 As the size of the grants diminish, the incen-
tive to opt into the system and abide by spending and contribution
limits in exchange for public funds is reduced. Not surprisingly,
then, the percentage of candidates opting into the Wisconsin public
funding program declined from a high of 55% in 1986 to just 14% in
2000.29 In 1999 the challenger for a supreme court seat declined to
accept public funds-the total sum available was S27,005-or vol-
untarily abide by spending limits, which authorized the incumbent to
receive that whole sum available and to exceed her spending limit.3
0
Combined spending in the race exceeded $1.36 million.31 The reac-
tion of the press, public, and legal community to the sometimes
mean-spirited tenor of the 1999 campaign was negative, and in part
for that reason, the two candidates in the 2000 campaign agreed to
27. See More Supporting Publicly Financed Elections in State, CAP. TIMES
(Madison), Aug. 14, 1999, at 2A.
28. See infra app. B, "Campaign Funding and Expenditures in Contested
Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections 1979-1997," which reflects Wisconsin's
declining election fund disbursements over time.
29. See Few Take State Campaign Funds, Attached Strings (Oct. 21, 2000),
at http:/wwv.jsonline.comlnewsfstatefotOO/camp221021 00a.asp.
30. See Richard P. Jones, Abrahamson Camp Urges Rival to Show Re-
straint in Campaign Ads, MI.AVAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 1999, at 2.
31. See Sarah Wyatt, Court Candidates OK Spending Cap; Sykes and But-
ler to Accept Public Campaign Money and Agree to a Spending Limit of
$215,625, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 23, 2000, at 3B.
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abide by the $215,625 spending limit in exchange for grants of
$13,500.32
Given the woeful state of the election campaign fund, proposals
have been made to increase the size of the checkoff, and to provide
better information to the public about the program funded by the
checkoff.33 Even if the election fund were sufficient to underwrite
the grants contemplated by the program, however, candidates would
still raise 55% of the dollars needed to fund their campaigns from
private contributions; 34 in cases where one candidate declines to ac-
cept public money, all limits are off. For that reason, the Wisconsin
Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics issued a 1999 report
recommending that all supreme court and court of appeals races be
fully funded.35
C. Potential Problems with Publicly Funded Judicial Elections
There are several hurdles that public financing systems must
overcome to be effective, as reflected in the Wisconsin experience.
First and foremost is the need for an adequate source of public funds.
The experience of virtually all states that have tried them demon-
strates that tax add-ons are ineffective; experience in Wisconsin and
other states suggests that tax checkoffs are likewise problematic. 36
Checkoff proponents, however, have pointed to Minnesota-where a
five dollar checkoff is supplemented with other public funds to gen-
erate seven times more money for legislative races than in Wiscon-
sin, and where 99% of legislative candidates opt into the program-
to support the argument that tax checkoffs can be made to work.37
Further, without minimizing the political and philosophical issues it
32. See id.
33. See Richard P. Jones, Campaign Finance Bill Would Raise Checkoff,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 1999, at 2.
34. See Wis. STAT. § 11.26(9)(a) (2000).
35. See Sarah Wyatt, Group: Public Should Finance Court Races Ethics
Commission Report Says that Would Foster Public Trust in Bench, Wis. ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 1999, at 3B.
36. See infra app. C, "Tax Form Political Contribution 1990-1993," which
reflects somewhat dated but nonetheless revealing data on revenues generated
by add-ons and checkoffs in different states.
37. See Mike McCabe, Tax Checkoff Improves System, CAP. TIMES (Madi-
son), Apr. 12, 2000, at 6A.
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raises, there would be a certain logic to funding judicial elections
from monies generated by court system users: lawyers, through in-
creased licensing fees, and parties, through increased filing fees or
surcharges on criminal fines and civil penalties.
A second, closely related problem is that systems of partial pub-
lic funding may be of dubious value. To the extent that judges must
continue to raise significant sums of money from lawyers and or-
ganizations with an interest in the outcomes of cases the judges will
be deciding, the appearance problem will persist. Contribution limits
may help to reduce that perception, as may new recusal standards re-
cently adopted by the ABA.3" Full, or nearly full, public funding is
another possible solution, but one that places an even greater pre-
mium on the need for an adequate source of funds.
Third, how to account for the expenditures of independent or-
ganizations or political parties when imposing spending limits on
publicly funded candidates is an especially difficult problem to solve.
Authorizing publicly funded candidates to raise and spend more pri-
vate money to counter independent expenditures on their opponents'
behalf undermines the purpose of the program. Resort to supple-
mental public funds is therefore preferable, but public funds are fi-
nite, and upper limits must be imposed on the supplemental grants
that compliant candidates may receive and spend to counteract the
effects of excessive spending by opponents who have elected not to
receive public funds, or who are the beneficiaries of independent ex-
penditures. To the extent that the maximum supplemental public
38. In 1999, the ABA adopted Canon 3(E)(1)(e), which calls on a judge to
disqualify herself if the judge knows or learns that a party or a party's lawyer
has made aggregate contributions to a judge's campaign in excess of an
amount to be specified by the individual states. See ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(e) (1999) (amending ABA MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990)). In the new Canon 5(C)(3), judicial
candidates are told to "instruct his or her campaign committee(s)... not to ac-
cept campaign contributions for any election that exceed, in the aggregate," an
amount to be specified by the individual states. See ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(3) (1999) (amending ABA MODEL CODE OF
JuDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990)). The success of these new standards is
likely to turn in no small part on whether the public's perception of the maxi-
mum contribution a judicial candidate can receive without compromising her
impartiality coincides with the state supreme courts' perception when they es-
tablish maximum allowable contributions.
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grants given compliant candidates are unable to keep pgace with the
private spending of opposing candidates-or the parties or independ-
ent organizations that support them-the imbalance will persist.
Moreover, all of this assumes that independent organizations are
campaigning on "behalf' of their candidate in good faith, which may
not always be the case. If an organization attempts to undermine a
candidate by running consciously ham-handed commercials on the
candidate's behalf, such an act of sabotage should not entitle the op-
posing candidate-the candidate secretly favored by the organization
responsible for the commercials-to receive additional funds to
counter the sham ads. Election commissions must prepare to under-
take the complicated task of verifying the authenticity of independent
expenditures that trigger the disbursement of supplemental funds.
A fourth problem concerns the impact of public financing on
competition. To the extent that the availability of public money
makes running for elective office more attractive, publicly financed
judicial elections will tend to increase competition for judicial office.
On the one hand, increased competition is salutary in that it expands
voter choice. On the other hand, increased competition may under-
mine ongoing efforts to cool judicial campaign rhetoric and dissuade
candidates and the electorate from compromising judicial independ-
ence by turning elections into referenda on the popularity of incum-
bent judges' isolated decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
At a luncheon meeting of the ABA Commission on Separation
of Powers and Judicial Independence that I attended in 1996, Judge
Abner Mikva observed in passing that "just throwing money at a
problem is highly underrated." His point rings especially true in the
context of publicly financed judicial elections. With sufficient re-
sources, states could fully fund judicial elections at levels that no ra-
tional candidate would decline. Independent expenditures on behalf
of any given candidate could be countered by offering additional
public money to that candidate's opponent, thereby minimizing the
impact of private money on election outcomes. Public financing
proposals raise a variety of issues alluded to in this paper, but the
most critical among them is whether the political will can be found to
1480
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commit the public funds necessary to make public financing systems
solvent and workable.
The Wisconsin program-the only state program to subsidize
judicial elections-is now on the brink of financial failure, which has
fueled skeptics' suspicion that public financing is infeasible. Such a
conclusion may, however, be premature. First, campaign finance re-
form has become a high profile issue in presidential politics, indi-
cating a general need for finance reform. Second, significant public
financing programs have recently been adopted in Arizona, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont,39 which indicates that the political will
to create such programs exists. Third, the constitutionality of the
Maine program was recently upheld by the First Circuit, which
may encourage other states to implement similar programs. Fourth,
judicial elections have received an unprecedented volume of negative
national press in recent years, which may energize reform efforts and
lead more states to consider including judicial races within the ambit
of their public financing initiatives. For states that are unwilling to
jettison elections in favor of an appointive method of judicial selec-
tion, public financing should remain on the table as an alternative
means to control some of the adverse effects of private fund-raising
on judicial elections.
39. See Janieki, supra note 1.
40. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Govt'l Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445 (lst Cir. 2000).
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC FINANCING PROVISIONS
4 1
STATE
YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED
FUNDING
SOURCE
RECIPIENTS
OFFICES
COVERED ELECTIONS
AL 1983 Tax add-on Politicalparties
Political
1988 Tax add-on Partiesparties
AR Tax checkoff, Statewide Primary
1998 Initiative lobbyists' fees, Candidates and legisla- andfines, and penal- an eisla- a
ties tive general
1985 Political contri-
(Program bution taxes and Governor Primary
expired) candidate filing Candidates Can afees Cabinet general
FL
1998 Appropriation, Governor Primary
Constitutional voluntary fees, Candidates and and
Amendment other moneys Cabinet general
Tax checkoff, All nonfed- Primary
HA 1978 appropriation, Candidates eral elective and
other moneys offices general
ID 1975 Tax checkoff Politicalparties
IN 1976 Vanity license Politicalplate fees parties
41. See Janicki, supra note 1, at tbl. 1.
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STATE
YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED
FUNDING
SOURCE
RECIPIENTS
OFFICES
COVERED ELECTIONS
IA 1973 Tax checkoff Politicalparties
Political
1976 Tax checkoff Partiealparties
Appropriation,
KY cndidate filin Governor/ Primary and
1992 fees, commit- Candidates lieutenant
tee surplus governor slates general
funds
1973 Tax add-on Politicalparties
Appropriation,
ME qualifying
1996 contributions, Candidates Governor and Primary and
Initiative tax checkoff, legislative general
donations, and
fines
Gover-
MD 1974 Tax add-on Candidates nor/lieutenant Primary and
governor
1975 Tax checkoff Candidates Statewide Primary and
-general
MA Appropriation, Statewide,
1998 tax checkoff, legislative, and Primary and
Initiative election fines, Governor's general
and penalties Council
MI 1976 Tax checkoff Candidates Governor Primary andgeneral
Appropriation,income orproer Statewide andproperty tax Candidates legislative; Primary andMN 1974 checkoff, ex- and politi- state party general
cess anony- cal parties committees
mous contri-
butions
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STATE
YEAR
LEGISLATION
PASSED
FUNDING
SOURCE
RECIPIENTS OFFICES
COVERED
ELECTIONS
1998: Legisla-
tive 2000:
Adds Boards
Appropriation, of Regents and
NE 1992 tax checkoff, Candidates Education, and Generalpenalties, and Public Service
fees Commission
2002: Adds all
other statewide
officials
NJ 1974 Appropriation, Primary andtaxNJh19Candidates Governor general
NM 1992 Tax add-on Politicalparties
Political
1975 Tax checkoff Partieal
NC parties
1988 Tax checkoff Candidates Governor General
OH 1987 Tax checkoff Politicalparties
Political
1973 Tax checkoff PartiealRIpate
1988 Appropriation General office
tax checkoff Candidates (statewide) General
UT 1973 Tax checkoff Politicalparties
Appropria-
tion,tax
checkoff, Governor, Primary and
VT 1997 lobbyists' as- Candidates lieutenant general
sessment, and governor
corporation
filing fees
Political
VA 1982 Tax add-on Partiesparties
WI 1977 Tax Candida Statewide and General
checkoff legislative
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APPENDIX B
CAMPAIGN AND EXPENDITURES IN CONTESTED
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 1979-1997
NUMBER OF
CANDIDATES
TOTAL
RECEIPTS OF
ALL
CANDIDATES
WECF42 GRANT
MONEY RECEIVED
BY ALL
CANDIDATES
TOTAL
EXPENDITURES
OF ALL
CANDIDATES
1979 2 $101,708 S39,953 $102,564
1980 4 $194,393 $65,624 S200,691
1983 2 $269,050 $58,188 $283,113
1989 2 $362,114 $194,062 $428,496
1990 2 $389,564 $76,038 $386,398
1994 3 $284,581 $67,536 $289,725
1995 5 $709,041 $30,953 S907,953
1996 7 $824,228 $26,398 S825,453
1997 2 $899,074 $26,148 $898,310
2
1999 (only 1 par- $, $27,005 $1,325,000
ticipating)
2000 2 $30,000 $4 ,000
42. Data from Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund, supplied by Roy A.
Schotland.
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APPENDIX C
TAx FORM POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 1990-199343
1990
Add On
States Amount
% of
Returns Amount
% of
Returns Amount
% of
Returns
% of
Amount Returns
Alabama $13,597 1 $11,602 * $10,020 * NA
Arizona 16,195 * 16,508 * 19,897 * $18,898 *
California 188,238 * 169,358 * 157,970 * 127,188
Louisiana ** ** 1,410 * 1,04 *
Maine0  19,152 1 17,681 1 19,927 1 17,603 1
Massachu- 2
setts 69,44d 2 60,995 2 59,258 2 56,648
New
Mexico ** ** 1,542 * 1,370
North *
Carolina* 26,633 * 23,287 * 20,699 * 21,811
Virginia 37,632 1 35,110 1 34,818 I 14,842 *
370,893 334,541 325,541 1 259,4021
Check Off
States
Hawaii* $419,338 38 $456,952 40 $386,418 34 $375,965 35
Idaho 44,111 10 38,698 9 36,888 8 35,848 8
Iowa+  224,973 9 179,124 7 167,918 7 153,234 8
Kentucky 281,948 7 264,024 6 215,104 7 201,022 7
Michigan0 1,534,600 19 1,483,800 18 1,306,000 16 1,474,000 12
Minne- 12
sota' 1,878,310 15 1,683,405 13 1,638,530 13 1,544,19 1
New 29
Jersey* 1,263,831 34 1,191,48 33 1,112,06 31 1,024,911
North 14
Carolina 505,935 17 424,239 15 398,350 13 423,991
Ohio 1,064,105 21 1,090,456 21 987,161 19 946,429 19
Rhode
Island+  376,595 9 265,270 8 202,468 6 201,057 6
Utah 80,389 12 94,135 14 69,656 1 69,646 9
Wiscon- 14
sin* 431,478 1 407,179 16 378,824 15 359,66 1
. 8,105,613 17,578,769 6,899,383 6,809,9551
*Less than 0.5% of returns
** Fund not in effect for that year
0 In these states, the money goes into an election fund that is then allocated to candidates.
43. Data supplied by Ruth S. Jones, Arizona State University School of
Law.
June 2001] PUBLICLY FiNANCED ELECTIONS 1487
+ In these states, tax payers have options to give to political parties or to a general election
fund.
Note: percentages for Hawaii represent taxpayers, not returns.
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